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ABSTRACT
COURTNEY JANOS GERACI: Networking is Not Everything; The Murder of Aldo
Moro and the Factors That Led to the Eventual Decline ofthe Brigate Rosse
(Under the direction ofDr. Chiarella Esposito)

This thesis concerns the Brigate Rosse, an Italian terrorist organization that was
active from the late-1960s to the mid-1980s, the networks through which the Brigate
Rosse chose to work, how these networks helped/hindered the success of the Brigate
Rosse, and how the murder of Aldo Moro marked the turning point in the BR s success.
To gather data, T looked at primary sources, such as communications that were sent by
the BR and government documents, as well as secondary sources which examined the
actions ofthe Brigate Rosse,the networks they maintained, and the social and political
circumstances ofItaly spanning the period from the 1960s through the 1980s. My
findings show that the networks the BR had with the extra-parliamentary leftist
organizations did contribute to the success ofthe BR throughout the 1970s. The findings
also show that the BR’s murder of Aldo Moro negatively affected these networks. The
conclusion reached is that the Moro murder was the definitive marker for the downfall of
the Brigate Rosse, in that the murder resulted in the BR’s loss ofthe networks that had
contributed to its success up until the point ofthe murder.
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Introduction
According to William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg,terrorism can be defined
as a politically motivated crime intended to modify the behavior ofan audience. Thus
defined, this term can readily be applied to the actions ofthe Red Brigades(BR),an ultraLeftist, Italian terrorist organization active from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. The Red
Brigades were one organization created within the larger Italian revolutionary Left that
developed in the 1960s “out ofthe dramatic internal rift within the Left, between the
Italian Communist Party’s {Partito Commmista Italiano -PCI)reformist policy and
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology.”' Created by Renato Curcio in 1969,the
""Brigate Rosse^ as they are called in Italian, used both physical violence, such as
beatings and assaults, and terrorist acts aimed at the state, such as the bombing of empty
cars, kidnappings, and eventually murder as their form of political action, often targeting
political officials.
The actions that the Brigate Rosse took against the state were not unique to the
brigatisti(members of the Brigate Rosse). During the 1960s, the social, political, and
economic aspects ofItaly were drastically changing, as they were in many countries at
that time. The late-1960s revealed Italy’s economic decline after the boom ofthe 1950s.
The Italian population still had high expectations for the economy in the 1960s, but its
growth began to slow and finally stop. Although the cost ofliving rose for the next few

* Angelo Ventura, “II problema delle origini del terrorismo di sinistra,” in Donatella Della Porta(ed ),
Terrorismi in Italia (Bologna; Societa Editrice il Mulino, 1984), 106-110.

2

years,“along with unemployment and inflation...the distribution of wealth and power
was widely perceived to be unequal.””
As the economy continued to decline, the politics ofItaly also began to change.
Political movements began to form in the late 1960s, specifically the student movement
and the worker movement. The Italians, who had already begun some student protesting,
witnessed the example ofthe *“68ers” in France and their commanding student rebellion.
Italy’s university system was already experiencing problems. During the 1960s,there
was an incredible rise in student enrollments coupled with insufficient education budgets.
The educational structure could not provide for the surge of youth in Italy. As a result,
the universities in Italy were overwhelmed with student protests and demonstrations,
including the University ofTrento(where the Brigate Rosse originated).
Italy also experienced dissatisfaction from the workers in the late 1960s,
specifically during the “Hot Autumn” of 1969. Workers, unhappy with economic
decline, staged major labor strikes, disregarding the “modest increments won for them
It was during this time of unrest that such

during the mid-sixties by their unions,

groups as the Brigate Rosse and Potere Operaio(Worker Power — PO)formed.
Mainstream Italian political parties were also experiencing problems during the
late 1960s. The Center-Left government coalition had been hurt by fighting within the
Socialist Party, and “only a minority Christian Democratic cabinet could be formed.
«5

under Prime Minister Mariano Rumor,

The government under Rumor was a single

party government and, without a coalition, it was too weak to handle the escalating

^ Richard Drake, The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy (Indianapolis,
Indiana; University Press, 1989), 1.
^Ibid.
^ Ibid., 2.
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violence ofthe movements effectively. These problems and movements saw the rebirth
of Marxist ideology, which was proposed as the answer to the problems occurring in
Italy.
Changes were not only occurring in Italy, but on a global level in many other
countries, such as France, West Germany,and the trans-Atlantic counterpart,the United
States. Marxist ideologies returned in many of these countries, breaking forth through
such organizations as the Gauche Proletarienne in France,the Red Army Faction in
Germany,and the Brigate Rosse in Italy, all of which acted as conduits for the resurgence
of Marxist-Leninist teachings in modern-day Europe.^ The United States saw much
activity, whether from the Vietnam War protestors, the Black Panthers, or those involved
in the Free Speech Movement.^ Regardless oflocation, one can recognize a general
unrest ofthe times, an unrest that left an opening for acts of violence against the state.
Just as the voices ofthe Brigate Rosse could be echoed by other Leftist
organizations at the global level, other organizations in Italy were also joining the
struggle. By 1968, the new Left was formed “of militants who had learnt the language of
>98

antagonism, of revolution,

From the Left came many different groups, both illegal.

revolutionary groups(such as the BR)and legal, but extra-parliamentary groups.^ The
BR did not work alone, isolated from other organizations, but often worked within
multiple networks with other Leftist organizations to express their beliefs and execute
their actions more efficiently and precisely. The Brigate Rosse belonged to networks of

Ibid.
^ Drake, Revolutionary’Mystique, 10, 169n25.
■'ibid, 10.
* Patrick Cuninghame, “For an Analysis of Autonomia: An Interview With Sergio Bologna,” Storia
d'ltalia '68 ~ 77, 12 Mar. 2001.
<http://www.swan.ac.Uk/italian/movimento/movl/archivio/I:%200/l:S/patrick.htm> (10 Mar. 2004)
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legal, extra-parliamentary left-wing groups, such as Potere Operaio(Worker Power)and
Autonomia Operaia(Worker Autonomy- AO),as well as voiced opinions within legal,
extra-parliamentary left-wing journals, such as Potere Operaio and Rosso. The BR’s
connections with these legal organizations greatly influenced their success, working to
sustain and facilitate the objectives ofthe Red Brigades. The BR*s dependency on these
networks also eventually aided in its downfall. These orgamzations cut their ties to the
BR gradually as the Brigate Rosse grew more extremist, and specifically after the murder
of Aldo Moro on May 9, 1978. The networks between the BR and the legal, left-wing
organizations and journals played a vital role in the gro>vth ofthe Brigate Rosse, as well
as their eventual breakdown.
The international community ofcommunist organizations also played a role in the
continuance ofthe Brigate Rosse. After the severing of networks with the local Italian
organizations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Brigate Rosse turned to international
terrorist organizations for support. These organizations, such as the PLO (Palestine
Liberation Organization)and the Red Army Faction in Germany,shared the vision ofa
revolution against capitalism.

They believed in violence against the state, similar to the

beliefs ofthe Brigate Rosse, and a comraderie developed based on this shared vision.
While the support ofthese communist organizations did not increase the success ofthe
Brigate Rosse, they did help sustain the BR’s organization.
In the end, however, the support from the other Leftist organizations could not
keep the Brigate Rosse afloat. Over the years, the Brigate Rosse continued to grow more
violent, and the BR’s supporters grew more disillusioned. However, it was not until the

® Richard Drake, The Aldo Moro Murder Case (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England:
Harvard University Press, 1995), 265-269.
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kidnapping ofAldo Moro and his eventual murder on May 9, 1978 that these networks
became severed, hurting the future success ofthe Brigate Rosse. The murder of Aldo
Moro acted as a catalyst for a backlash against the Brigate Rosse, Their acts ofterrorism
had not only alienated the other Italian communist organizations, but had also alienated
the very proletarian population for which they were fighting. This dissent spread from
the workers to the BR itself, causing disillusionment among the ranks. Many ofthe
disillusioned brigaiisti chose to leave the organization and act as informants for the
government. The information ofthe pentiti(as the repentant brigaiisti were called),
combined with a lack ofeffective support from the Left and with increased anti-terrorist
forces eventually led the Brigate Rosse into a downward spiral from which they could not
recover.
During the course ofthe 1970s and 1980s, the Brigate Rosse committed many
politically motivated acts of physical violence and terror. These acts have received the
majority of attention from the state, media, and intellectuals. Much has been written on
the extremism ofthe Red Brigades, with focus on the types of and chronological order in
which the terrorist acts were committed. However,analyzed alone, these terrorist acts
only give a one-dimensional view ofthe Red Brigades as a terrorist organization. While
one analyzes which actions were performed, the effects on the Brigate Rosse from
outside sources that aided or hindered the BR must also be analyzed.
The Moro murder set offa reaction against the Brigate Rosse from the left-wing
extra-parliamentary organizations, the proletariat, the government, and even some ofthe
BR’s own members. The effects that the loss of support, disillusionment, and increased
government intervention had on the Brigate Rosse were devastating for the organization.

Drake, Revolutionary Mystique, 150.
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To understand the Brigate Rosse in their entirety, one must not only take into account the
actions completed by the organization, but also the ways in which the inter-organizational
networks helped and/or hindered their actions. One must also understand why the death
of Aldo Moro acted as the turning point in the Brigate Rosse’s proletarian struggle. By
undervaluing the roles ofthese other actors, one loses an important aspect that
contributed, not only to the overall impact and success ofthe Brigate Rosse^ but also to
its eventual decline.

7

Early History of the Brigate Rosse
The Brigate Rosse were a revolutionary, ultra-leftist organization based on
Marxist-Leninist teachings. Formed out ofthe student movement ofthe late 1960s,the
Brigate Rosse gradually came to be a militant organization and a terror for Italian
politics. Its history can be traced back to Renato Curcio at the end ofthe 1960s, during
the student movements. At the time ofthe student movements, Renato Curcio and his
future wife, Margherita Cagol,two of original founders ofthe Brigate Rosse, were
students at the University of Trento.
Though the student movement was powerful, Curcio recognized the “apparent
inability ofthe ‘system’ and the old-guard political parties to tackle the fundamental
economic and social problems facing the country,” and understood that such a problem
would require a larger revolution than the student movement,

Curcio left the University

of Trento in 1969 and moved to Milan in search of a larger form of revolution. Curcio
found this larger revolution in the workers’ movement. Joining the Colletivo Politico
Kdetropolitano (Metropolitan Political Collective - CPM), he began preaching to workers
about the state and about needed reforms. He encouraged them to protest against the
bourgeois and the elite, who had forgotten about the hardworking proletariat. The umon
bosses were seen as affiliates ofthe state, who could no longer sympathize with the
workers. From the CPM,the Brigate Rosse was formed in 1969. Consisting of a number

'' Dominick J. Coyle, Minorities in Revolt: Political Violence in Irelatid, Italy, and Cypres (London.
Associated University Presses, Ltd ), 115-116.
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of university student protesters and factory workers,the Brigate Rosse were organized to
fight the elitist views ofthe state and its capitalist policies.
Curcio once described the struggle ofthe Brigate Rosse as an attempt to “make
vl2

the Great Leap Forward,

The Great Leap Forward was a communist cultural

revolution and a rejection ofcapitalism.

Curcio wanted a commumst revolution that

returned to the basics of Marxist ideology, with a renewed focus on restoring ideological
purity, and purged Italy of capitalism, which he viewed as hurting the proletariat.
From the time ofthe Brigate Rossers conception,the chosen activities ofthe
members had changed drastically. Violence did not start immediately after the formation
ofthe Brigate Rosse, but grew gradually as time went on. The Sinistra proletaria, a
leaflet concerning the struggle ofthe revolutionary Left, displayed the traditional symbols
ofthe sickle and hammer ofthe Communist party, but added a picture ofa rifle “as the
most vivid indication of how serious they were about taking the war to the class
enemy.

14

This was a blatant call to arms. The Brigate Rosse continued to become more

violent as the leaflet’s requests grew more violent. The discussions in Sinistra proletaria
became increasingly militant and can be summarized in a statement made in the October
1970 issue, stating that the Brigate Rosse represent “the first moments of the proletariat’s
,»15

self-organization in order to fight the bosses and their henchmen,

The pamphlet acted

as a catalyst for violence, driving the emotions ofthe revolutionaries.

“Curcio dal carcere; ‘La lotta annata e finita,”’ La Repubblica, 25 January 1983.
“History of the PRC(1949 - 1976),” Asimh.Net Global Encyclopedia, n.d.,
<http;//china.asinah.net/en/wikipedia/h/hi/history_of_thejprc_1949_1976_.html> (21 Apr. 2004).
' Drake, Revolutionary Mystique, 9-10.
‘^Ibid., 9-10.
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Violence, however, was not all theories and discussion. The members ofthe
«16

Brigate Rosse demanded,“for every eye,two eyes; for every tooth, an entire face,

The

violence began with the destruction of objects, mostly vehicles. In September 1970,
violence had seen an increase at factories in Milan. The Brigate Rosse used this violence
to further their agenda, and on different occasions, cars belonging to executives were
either set on fire or bombed,although the cars were always empty. Violence continued to
escalate, and, on March 3,1972,for the first time the BR targeted a human being, which
occurred in the form of a kidnapping. The victim was an executive for SIT-Siemens
{Societa Jtaliana Telecomunicazioni- Siemens^ Idalgo Macchiarini. He was held
captive and eventually released “with a sign around his neck that read; Strike one to
educate a hundred.

It was nonviolent and symbolic, expressing the dissatisfaction of

the proletariat without resulting in injury. However,this action wasjust the beginning of
a string ofkidnappings and would eventually lead to murder.
This progression of violence can be broken down into four phases of activity, two
through which the brigatisti chose to work. The first phase was from 1969 to 1973, and
the second phase was from 1974 to 1979. The progression ofthe activities shows the
development of political terrorism over the years. The first phase began in the years post1968,from 1969 to 1973. The activity ofthe Brigate Rosse started a year later, in August
1970 in Milan.

The earliest terrorist attacks ofthe Brigate Rosse were highly symbolic

and low on physical injury. Often arson was the action ofchoice, as the brigatisti
targeted cars belonging to managers of large firms or of neo-fascists. As Paul Furlong

A February 1970 interview ofEvola by Enrico de Boccard in Playmen was entitled “Conversations
without Complications with the ‘Last Ghibelline,”’ in De Tunis(ed.), Omaggio.
Drake, Revolutionary Mystique, 11.
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states, The arson attacks constituted bread-and-butter operations undertaken against
representative targets with the aim both ofinducing terror among the ‘ruling class’ and of
19

stimulating the working class to take up arms” without causing great injury,

There

were also occasionally well-publicized kidnappings that always resulted in the release of
the captive. This was a symbolic time in which the brigatisti were making themselves
known as the avengers ofthe proletariat and did not need extreme violence for their
cause. It was not until later that violence became the main tactic.

18

Paul Furlong, “Political Terrorism in Italy: Responses, Reactions, and Immobilism,” in Juliet Lodge
(ed
). Terrorism: A Challenge to the State (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1981), 70.
19
Furlong, “Political Terrorism in Italy,” 70-71.
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Support by Left-wing Extra-parliamentary Organizations and Journals
The journalist Giorgio Bocca has said that “not Red Brigadism alone, but Red
Brigadism tolerated and even supported for a long time by various extra -parliamentaiy
„20

Left groups, is what made the armed struggle the terrible ordeal it was for Italy,

This

support was constructed through a complicated system ofinterconnected networks, of
“historic connections between the Brigate Rosse and other extra-parliamentary Left
action groups”- including Potere Operaio(POTOF)and Autonomia Operaia, as well as
certain Leftist journals, such as Potere Operaio and Rosso?^ POTOP,as the Potere
Operaio was called, and Autonomia Operaia^ along with their journals, aided the actions
ofthe Brigate Rosse through verbal and written support, praising the fight ofthe Brigate
Rosse for the proletariat.
These extra-parliamentary Left organizations observed and recognized the
dissatisfaction occurring among the population during the late 1960s. The source ofthe
problems that the student and worker movements were fighting against seemed to be
capitalism. The economy was functioning poorly, the educational system was
unacceptable, and the government, always led by the Christian Democrats, was not strong
enough to change the situation. Even the PCI had become too moderate for the extreme
Left. With a reemergence of radical Marxist ideology, and no true left-wing party on
which to rely, the militant intellectuals and proletariat elements felt that change depended
on them and began their Marxist revolution.

Drake, The Aldo Mow Murder Case, 173.
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Potere Operaio
POTOP,an extra-parliamentary Left-wing group created in 1969» was headed by
Antonio(Toni)Negri, an intellectual and a professor at the University ofPadua, who
started a local chapter ofPOTOP in Padua in the early 1960s. In 1969,POTOP became
a national organization through the unification ofmultiple like-minded organizations,
such as '^'‘Classe Operaia^ Potere Operaio Veneto-Emiliano(a regional group and
newspaper dedicated to factory struggles in [northeast] Italy), and through the various
local factory initiatives, particularly in the Porto Maghera chemical plants, uniting
,»23

intellectuals and industrial workers.

Although one ofthe main concepts ofPOTOP was “spontaneity,” something
distant from the Leninist ideology that they believed,the potopisti(members ofPOTOP)
nevertheless considered themselves Leninist in tradition. They recommended the
rejection ofthe work ethic as well as the rejection ofany type oflabor “in all its industrial
»,24

forms as the way by which the capitalist system could be brought down,

A rejection

of work was required, but passive resistance was not enough. On September 24,1971, at
a convention held in Rome’s Palazzo dei Congressi,POTOP argued for a constantly
increasing “‘anti-institutional violence’ until the volume of proletarian protest had risen
from the present pre-Revolutionary levels to the next stage ofthe dialectic,” which was
open revolution.

The call for violence was escalating for POTOP and for all extreme

Left-wing organizations, such as the Brigate Rosse.

21

Ibid, 89.
William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, The Rise and Fall oflialicm Terrorism (Boulder and
London; Westview Press, 1987), 57.
23
Cuninghame,“For an Analysis of Autonomia; An Interview With Sergio Bologna”.
24
Eubank and Weinberg, The Rise and Fall ofItalian Terrorism, 57.
25
Drake, Revolutionary Mystique, 85,
22
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Journals were often used in Italian extremism as a form ofrevolutionary
propaganda. They were not only used to umte the revolutionaries to promote terrorism,
but they were also used as a sounding board for expressing new ideas and sending
information. With the unification ofthe POTOP came a journal ofthe same name,
Potere Operaio^ which was also launched with help from Negri,
Potere Operaio writers often promoted violence as the only true way to maintain
a state of crisis and to achieve revolution. Italy became considered the “Vietnam ofthe
West” as POTOP counseled that the revolutionaries look to the Vietcong for a source of
inspiration. For, with the Vietcong as an example,“it was not at all adventurism to shoot
high-level state fimctionaries...it was not adventurism to assault police stations in order
to procure arms and...to execute those high state authorities hated by the urban and rural
^>26

proletariat.

Violence was praised and preached within the pages ofPotere Operaio.

TTie potopisti had always believed that “without violence ‘the proletariat is mutilated,
castrated in the concrete possibility to liberate itself

The violent views expressed in

Potere Operaio substantiated the initial actions ofthe Brigate Rosse, such as car
bombings(of empty cars belonging to industrial leaders) and kidnappings. Renato
Curcio,the founder ofthe Brigate Rosse, was an avid reader ofthe journal. Concerning
some early kidnappings performed by the Brigate Rosse,the journal states, “They are
new forms of worker struggle, in the cities, that are rapidly gaining ground; this practice
of organized violence on the part ofthe proletariat is rendered obligatory by the growth
„28

of the class conflict and by its characteristic of violence.

26

In fact, the early actions of

Potere Operaio, March 5-19,1971, no. 37, as quoted in Drake, The Revolutiojtary Mystique. 84.
Ibid., 87.
“Proletari, e la Guerra di classe,” Potere Operaio, 20 May - 20 June 1972, no. 47-48, as quoted in Drake,
Revolutionary Mystique, 87.

27
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the Brigate Rosse were more or less in agreement with the broader notion ofthere being a
need for violence, as recommended by Negri and his

potopisti.

This ongoing

agreement for armed struggle created a persistent dialogue between the members of
POTOP and the Brigate Rosse in the following years, before they would choose to
separate themselves along lines ofrevolutionary theory.

Autonomia Operaia
Autonomia Operaia was an extra-parliamentary left-wing group representative of
“exploited workers” that promoted the slogan: “Work is not a manner ofliving, but the
,,30

obligation to sell oneselfin order to live,

It was a “direct descendent ofthe operaist
„31

tradition, stemming from the seminal Quaderni Rossijomml ofthe early 1960s.
Autonomia Operaia focused, not only on wages and working conditions for laborers, but
also on fair housing and the school system, using mass protests and so-called difftise
terrorism,” often more symbolic and less dangerous than the terrorism ofthe BR. The
activism of Autonomia Operaia naturally attracted the Brigate Rosse, however, who also
perceived Italy, or more specifically, the proletarians ofItaly,“as being dominated by the
imperialist state ofthe multinationals” with the Christian Democratic Party as the
44

,32

foremost representative of the imperialist State.’

^Autonomia Operaia and Brigate

Rosse shared the same ideology, and both organizations recognized the need for violence.
However, each group’s vision of necessary violence was somewhat different
29

Drake, Revoluiiotiary Mystique, 87.
Vittorfranco Pisano, “The Brigate Rosse; A Challenge to Italian Democracy,” in W.G.(ed.).
Contemporary Terrorism(New York, NY and Oxford, England; Facts ofFile Publications, 1986), 175
31
Cuninghame,“For an Analysis of Autonomia; An Interview With Sergio Bologna”.

30
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A utonomia Operaia was created in 1973 by Antonio Negri after his split from the
organization’s predecessor,POTOP,because ofthis different view of violence. With the
increasing violence ofsome ofthe more extreme Leftist organizations, Negn felt his
message of revolution was being lost in a flurry of violence without reason. Negri
espoused terrorist acts, but not as the only form ofrevolution. He felt that ‘terrorism had
to be counted as a legitimate weapon in the proletariat’s arsenal-[however] not the only
,,33

weapon...

This is the point on which Autonomia Operaia and the Brigate Rosse

differed. The Brigate Rosse seemed to believe that terrorism was tibie only effective
weapon.
However,though there was a difference of beliefs, the two organizations rallied
around the need for revolution, and the Autonomia Operaia fully supported the Brigate
Rosse, even though their ways of achieving the revolution would be different. As stated
in “Ordine di cattura,” an article published in Rosso on October 18,1975:
Certainly by 1974 Negri and his Autonomia Operaia circle were
expressing their opposition to the excessive...emphasis ofthe Brigate
Rosse on terror as the sole means of bringing about the revolution. Rosso
[the journal published by Autonomia Operaia] insisted that violence had to
be ‘useful and functional,’ not be based on anarchist myths about the
sacred power of spontaneous revolutionary acts.^^
Yet even in 1975 Rosso showed disapproval ofthe terrorist violence ofthe Brigate Rosse
more as an error than as a sin,“a problem ofemphasis rather than of character...The
Brigate Rosse might be going too far. Rosso conceded, but at least they had gone in the
,„35

right direction, toward the ‘armed struggle of communism.

32

They needed a revolution.

Pisano,“The Brigate Rosse,” 175.
Drake, Revolutionary Mystique, 88.
34
Drake, Revolutiotiary Mystique, 91.
35
“Ordine di cattura,” Rosso, 18 October 1975, no. 2, as quoted in Drake, Revolutionary Mystique, 91

33
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and in order to maintain a revolution,the leaders ofAutonomia Operaia were not going
to cut ties with other important Left-wing organizations, such as the Brigate Rosse.
In fact, the organizations ofthe Left often supported one another as a force
against the state. Franco Pipemo,one ofthe leaders of AO,wrote an article called Dal
terrorismo alia guerriglia'^(“From Terrorism to Guerrilla Warfare”)that stated,in
support ofthe Brigate Rosse,“Dysftmctional societies inevitably produce revolutions,
and the ‘coherent’ and ‘efficacious* use ofterrorist violence by the Brigate Rosse had to
be understood as such a consequence.

Pipemo was not praising the actions ofthe

Brigate Rosse, but rather justifying them by making the consequent deaths and
destruction ultimately the fault ofthe state.
As previously acknowledged, most extra-parliamentary left-wing organizations
had journals to aid communication among the orgamzations ofthe Left. Just as POTOP
had Potere Operaio under Negri, Negn launched the journal Rosso when he became one
of the leaders ofAutonomia Operaia. Just as the writings ofPotere Operaio supported
the Brigate Rosse,so too did the writings ofRosso, out ofthe need for a cohesive and
unified mass revolution.
For example, as the Turin trial ofcaptured brigatisti began in the fall of 1975,
Rosso condemned the prosecution’s argument that Curcio and the other defendants were
criminals.,»37 The articles printed in Rosso at this time declared the brigatisti
revolutionaries in the Marxist sense ofthe term because they had attacked capitalism in
^«38

the name of the proletariat and ofcommunism,

Rosso criticized the PCI for its

rejection ofthe pure Marxist-Leninist practice ofthe Brigate Rosse. Alberto
36
37

Drake, The AIdo Moro Murder Case, 158.
Drake, Revolutionary Mystique, 91.
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Franceschini, one of the leaders ofAutonomia Operaia, wrote a letter to Rosso warning
that “the reformist pigs in the PCI,now trying to degrade the Brigate Rosse revolution by
criminalizing it, would not be forgotten by the proletariat....Rosso could only lament ‘the
climate of psychological terror’ created by the state in its nakedly reactionary plot ‘to
criminalize the armed struggle.
Even after Curcio’s capture in 1976,Autonomia Operaia and Rosso continued to
support Curcio. They did not view it as a setback for the revolution.

Autonomia

Operaia and Rosso were eager to show their support ofthe Marxist militant who was
truly a symbol of revolution for his brigatisti followers, as well as other revolutionaries.
As late as the summer and fall of 1977,Rosso was still supporting brigatismo rosso as
40

one aspect ofthe attack on capitalism.
Even when Rosso articles were not specifically discussing the Brigate Rosse,the
articles, as well as the writings ofNegri, often showed support for the organization’s
actions, even if not for the ideas that were guiding the actions. “By depicting shooting,
sabotage, strikes, subversive and even criminal behavior as legitimate tools for the ‘destructuralization’ ofthe capitalist economy,” Negri gave legitimacy to the actions ofthe
41

Brigate Rosse.

By inciting violence as a necessary means ofrevolution, Negri’s words

encouraged the Brigate Rosse to continue their violent actions.
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Early Reaction of the Government
Although the loss of support from the Italian Left-wing extra-parliamentary
organizations and the proletariat forced the Brigate Rosse to look to the international
arena for support, these international organizations could not save the Brigate Rosse from
the decline that began so abruptly with the murder of Aldo Moro. Though the Brigate
Rosse remained intact and active, the government enacted a series oflaws that, combined
with the denunciation ofthe Left-wing extra-parliamentary orgamzations, would prove to
be the BR’s undoing.
Starting as early as 1974,the Italian government began responding to the
terrorism of the brigatisti with brute force, beginmng with the first Nucleo Dalla Chiesa,
a special anti-terrorism unit ofthe police in Turin placed under the direction of
Carabinieri General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa. The Carabinieri were members ofthe
Italian military police force. The Nucleo Dalla Chiesa was assigned the task of
42

countering the Brigate Rosse.

However,it was not until the second Nucleo Dalla

Chiesa, created in 1979 after the Moro murder,that major improvements could be seen.
This second Nucleo “focused on the direct connection between analysis, information, and
operations [of the BR],the so called ‘antiguerrilla technique’” to better understand and
43

effectively eradicate the Brigate Rosse.

Nucleo Dalla Chiesa made the first terrorist

arrests and provided thorough information on the structure and composition ofthe
Brigate Rosse.
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The government also implemented the Reale Law early on,in 1975. Although the
main targets of the law were fascist parties, the law covered all clandestine organizations
pursuing violence against the state, including the Brigate Rosse. “The Reale Law
effectively gave the authorities more power to combat the terrorists, by making
"sentences for terrorist crimes much more sever,[placing] restrictions on bail and
[giving] the security forces power to search and arrest without a formal warrant on
»9944

suspicion and to hold suspects for forty-eight hours,

This law also gave the

authorities “more freedom to use firearms”, although later amendments,“[made in July
,45

1977 and April 1978] controlled the use of firearms and explosives.

The Second Generation
While the initial actions ofthe Brigate Rosse did spark a reaction from the state,
the BR’s initial actions were not effective in gaining mass support from the proletariat.
As a clandestine organization, the Brigate Rosse were unable to form a relationship with
the very people their actions were representing. “Both the failure ofthe strategy ofterror
to induce the desired responses in the working class and the repeated spectacular mass
terrorism ofthe right” was interpreted as an indication that the BR needed to further
46

intensify their actions.

As the second phase ofterrorism began,there was a great

escalation of violence among the actions ofthe Brigate Rosse as a response to the
reactions ofthe state and as an attempt to gain the wider support among the proletariat.
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The second phase spanned from 1974 to 1979. The year 1974 is a proper dividing
point within the decade of terrorism, because it “saw the maturity ofthe strategy ofthe
Brigate Rosse into the objective of striking at the heart ofthe state...and it saw the
emergence of a variety of Left-wing groups committed,like the Brigate Rosse^ to
political terrorism, though lacking the expertise and discipline ofthat group.”^’ From
48

1974 on, there was a substantial increase in all terrorist activity, as noted in Table 1.
TABLE I Termrist Attacks 1969 - 78
With
Others
Total
With Bqjlosive Incendiaiy
Devices
Devices
1969
145
214
69
144
112
55
311
11970
343
197
146
11971
474
24
11972
275
175
1973
3
310
117
190
145
317
20
482
il974
130
1 1975
436
62
628
1976
805
238
158
1201
; 1977
136
459
1532
2127
1978
749
1460
2395
186
I Source:Furlong,Paul. '*Politicla Terrorism in Italy". Terrorism:A Challenge to
the State. Ed. Juliet Lodge. (New York:St. Martin's Press, htc., 1981). 73.
I
Originalsource:Ministry ofthe intenor.

As previously stated, the hrigatistVs objective was to strike at the heart ofthe
state, using the dual strategy of attacks on middle-ranking officials with the occasional
grand attack. They completed such grand attacks as kidnapping Mario Sossi, a public
prosecutor in Genoa, on April 18,1974."^^ The act against Sossi was the first taking the
Brigate Rosse away from the factories and the S3mibolic actions against private
businesses and into direct confrontation with the state. Only a few weeks after the Sossi
kidnapping in 1974, a group of brigatisti entered the headquarters for the MSI

'Mbid.,
72.
48
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(Movimento Sociale Italiano - Italian Social Movement)in Padua and murdered two neo50

fascist officials.

This incident was the first time members ofthe Brigate Rosse resorted

to murder. On June 8,1976,the BR murdered Fancesco Coco,the chief magistrate in
Genoa.
By 1977, merely striking at the heart ofthe state was no longer enough. There
was an even greater escalation of violence brought on by the arrest of most ofthe Brigate
Rossers early leadership group. The BR’s new Direzione Strategica (Strategic
Direction), its national leadership group, pushed the Brigate Rosse not only to strike at
the heart of the state, but also to ‘^disarticulate” it.^‘ The Brigate Rossers second
generation of leaders, such as Barbara Balzeram and Patriino Peci, wanted to make the
BR more militaristic, which they saw as the only way to achieve the goals ofthe
organization. To disarticulate the state, they believed the most effective actions would be
“attacks on Christian Democratic leaders and intermediate level functionaries, trade
union representatives, Communist party officers and various middle ranking members of
the state bureaucracy.

,52

The Left greatly increased the number ofterrorist attacks in

1977 to 2,127 separate terrorist attacks, almost twice the number ofthe previous year, as
53

noted in Table 1 on page 20.

Along with their escalation of violence, the Brigate Rosse were experiencing
severe losses due to the early reactions ofthe state. Many ofthe brigatisti were killed in
struggles with the police or were arrested. In November 1974, Alfredo Buonavita, who
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was leading the Brigate Rosse during Curcio’s prison incarceration, was arrested. By the
end of 1974, Alberto Franceschini and Prospero Gallinari, among others, had also been
arrested. Margherita Cagol, Renato Curcio’s wife and one ofthe leaders ofthe Brigate
Rosse, was killed in a gun battle with police in June 1975. To make matters worse,
54

Curcio was recaptured following a January 18,1976 gun battle with police in Milan.
The original leaders ofthe Brigate Rosse were no longer able to provide leadership.
This second phase,from 1974 to 1979, was not only characterized by more
extreme violence, but also by a new group ofbrigatisti within the ranks,coined the
“second generation.” Formed out ofthe student movement and labor unrest ofthe late
1960s, the Brigate Rosse were originally composed of a “historic nucleus,” including
such ex-Catholic students as Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol, and Giorgio Semeria, and
former activists ofthe PCI and its youth organization, such as Alberto Franceschini,
Prospero Gallinari, and Lauro Azzolini. Some ofthe members were also former militants
of the extra-parliamentary Left-wing parties and groups, such as Mario Moretti and Pietro
Bertolozzi, most of whom were working in industry in the Milan area with major
55

industries, such as SIT-Siemens.

Towards the end ofthe 1970s, the make up ofthe Brigate Rosse had begun to
change. Most members ofthe Brigate Rosse''s “historic nucleus” were in prison awaiting
trial. Curcio, the leader ofthe Brigate Rosse, was captured on 9 September 1974 and
again on Januaiy 18,1976. Also,through the spread ofthe revolution and the
recruitment ofthe Brigate Rosse,the organization had many new members. By 1977,
the Brigate Rosse were becoming younger, almost exclusively comprised of students

Drake, Revo/utiottary Mystique, 19-20.
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from middle-class families, and far fewer workers than the previous generation. There
was also an increase in “supporters,” who were “well-off young people,[who had been]
attracted to political radicalism out ofa profound sense ofguilt over the plight ofthe
»56

world’s largely poor populatioa
The “second generation” was made up of brigatisti who were more “technically
»57

proficient individuals, but less intellectual and more violent,

This generation “clearly

had another social basis, different from both 1968 and 1973. It had a social composition
based on youth who had broken with or rejected the political elites, including the elites of
1968.,,58 When POTOP officially disbanded in 1972 as a legal, above-ground
organization, a segment of its more extremist members found their way to the Brigate
Rosse. This younger generation was also a more extremist generation,committed to a
form ofterrorism that would eventually lead to the murder of Aldo Moro,a prominent
figure within the Christian Democratic Party.
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The Aldo More Murder
Aldo Moro was Prime Minister ofItaly from November 1963 to June 1968, with
the emergence of a new center-Left government coalition joining the Christian
Democrats and the Italian Socialist Party.

Thinking he could appease the unrest ofthe

extra-parliamentary Left, in the late 1960s he decided the government needed to
legitimize the Communist party and integrate it into Italy’s democracy. The new
generation of Communist leaders had taken a more moderate path and seemed to be more
flexible than the staunch Stalinists ofthe previous generation. This potential agreement
between the Communists and the Christian Democrats,though it never came to be, was
60

known as the Historic Compromise.
The Historic Compromise was originally suggested by Enrico Berlinguer, the
leader ofthe PCI, and then later by Moro in June 1969 when he appealed to the Eleventh
Congress ofthe Christian Democrats to initiate a dialogue with the Communists. He
urged the Christian Democrats to “explore the possibility of‘a new communism [that
was] compatible with an advanced industrial economy, a mature democracy, a living and
open society,

Some Christian Democrats saw the possibilities that could come with

the support ofthe PCI, and Moro wanted to use this support to end the turmoil in Italy.
However,the Brigate Rosse, who viewed the PCI as having become too
moderate, thought Moro’s resolution would worsen the problem at hand. The PCI
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members were considered “sellouts” by the Brigate Rosse for losing the traditional ideas
of Communism. This loss oftraditional ideas was the worst insult the PCI could give.
For the members of the Brigate Rosse “the party’s about-face was nothing less than a
sacrilege, and their reaction typified that ofCommunists all over Italy for whom Marxism
had been an evangelical faith.

The brigatisti felt that by the practice ofcompromise

with the “soft-line Christian Democrat rulers,” the PCI also seemed to “seek the defeat of
„63

the revolutionary tensions which [permeated]and [stirred]the working class,

On the

contrary, the Historic Compromise merely increased the revolutionary tensions ofthe
extreme Left.
As the actions ofthe BR became more violent, the Brigate Rosse thought they
could persuade change with an action of more gravity than their previous actions, and this
could be done by kidnapping Aldo Moro. Moro,the former Premier and Christian
Democratic Party president, was abducted on March 16,1978 in Rome “on his way to the
Parliament to participate in the vote of confidence for Italy’s thirty-first government
under the Republican Constitution of 1948.

After Moro was held in capti\ity for fifty-

four days, on May 9,1978 his corpse was found, riddled with eleven bullet holes, in ftie
trunk of a car “following the Government’s refusal to release [thirteen]terrorists on trial.
including Renato Curcio, the reputed historic leader ofthe Red Brigades.
Immediately after Moro’s kidnapping,the Brigate Rosse offered some reasoning
behind it, as to why his kidnapping held more importance than the others. He was
considered “the most authoritative leader, the undisputed ‘theorist’ and ‘strategist’ ofthat
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Christian Democratic regime that for thirty years[had] oppressed the Italian people.
For the Brigate Rosse, the kidnapping of Aldo Moro was to symbolize their entire
revolution. They viewed Moro’s kidnapping as a “‘perfect action from a technical67

military standpoint,” although this opinion was not shared by the majority ofthe Left.
Moro was viewed as the embodiment of capitalism. Also, as the leader ofthe Christian
Democratic party pushing for the Historic Compromise, he had the ability(from the view
point of the extra-parliamentary Left)to weaken the PCI by diluting its message into that
of left-leaning Christian Democrats. He was not only a symbol, but an enemy.

Increased Reaction of the Government
After the murder of Aldo Moro,the government continued to escalate its
response to the terrorists. Although laws were passed to quelch the terrorist acts prior to
the Moro murder, it was not until after the Moro kidnapping that security forces were
granted the right to interrogate legally without the presence ofa defense lawyer,
sentences for kidnapping were increased, and telephone tapping was made easier for the
68

security forces.
While the government was making punishments harsher for terrorists and was
making it easier for the security forces to capture terrorists, the government was also
using another strategy to win the fight against terrorism. In 1980 it passed the Cossiga
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law, which greatly lightened sentences for the pentiti(repentant terrorists) and handed out
more severe sentences for unrepentant terrorists. The lightened sentences successfully
persuaded the repentant terrorists to disassociate themselves from their colleagues and
help the authorities. Ifthey were willing to “renounce their lives of violence,identify
other members of their group, and provide the authorities with other forms ofconcrete
assistance,” their sentences would be reduced.^^ This law resulted in large numbers of
pentiti coming forward, many of whom had become disillusioned with the revolutionary
struggle and wanted to save themselves, and merely added to the numbers ofpentiti who
had come forward after 1978.
The combination oflaws, increased antiterrorist forces, and aid from the pentiti
greatly damaged the Brigate Rosse. By the end of 1979,just one and a half years after
the murder of Aldo Moro, many ofthe Brigate Rosse had been caught with the help of
70

the pentiti.

TABLE 2 Terrorists ofthe Left Imprisoned,Indicted,or Identified
(as of 19 December 1979)
Red Brigades(BR)
Armed Proletarian Nuclei(NAP)
Front Line(PL)
Revolutionary Action(AR)
Communist Combat Units(UCC)
Other
!Total

357
182
131
36
26
10
742

I Source:Pisano, Vittorfranco. ”The Brigate Rosse:A Challenge to
Italian Democracy". Contemporary Terrorism. Ed. William
Gutteridge. (Ne^v York and Oxford:Facts ofFile Publications, 1986). 187.
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Spanning the course ofthe night through the morning ofDecember 2-3,1980,the Nuclei
Dalla Chiesa successfully arrested 26 terrorists, confiscated an arsenal, and discovered
terrorist documents. With the help ofthe pentitu the police also captured Giovanni
Senzani, a terrorist with the Brigate Rosse whom thepentiti named as the “real leader of
«71

the [Brigate Rosse] since the period of Moro’s kidnapping.
The most severe damage to the Brigate Rosse, and possibly its largest failure, did
not come until a short time later, when one ofthe pentiti informed the police of where the
brigatisti were keeping General Dozier. General Dozier was a Vietnam war veteran and
the deputy chief of staff for logistics and administration at NATO’s headquarters in
Southern Europe. On January 27,1982, a Nucleo team raided the hideout where Dozier
was being kept. The raid ended in the rescue of General Dozier and the arrest offive
terrorists. This failure ofthe BR reaffirmed the strength ofthe government and its laws,
as well as the decline that the BR was then facing.
It was through the pentiti that the police learned the whereabouts ofGeneral
Dozier. The rescue of General Dozier was viewed as so successful, and the aid ofthe
pentiti so imperative for the fight against terrorism,that on May 29,1982, another law
was passed. This law was created to further persuade repentant terrorists to divulge
information by “[extending] clemency, no punishment,to those guilty of membership in
terrorist groups, armed bands or subversive associations, ifthey were willing to repent
«72

and provide the authorities with help,

It also offered “reduced prison terms for
,,73

repentant terrorists responsible for acts of violence.

However,to further pressure the

pentiti to come forward,the government placed a time limit ofeight months on the law,
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after which the rewards for repentance would revert back to those provided under the
1980 law.
Once the government discovered how good a weapon the pentiti were at fighting
terrorism, it pushed the pentiti as far as they would go to get as much information as
possible. And the pressure 'Wdcs successful. At their point of maximum expansion,from
1978 until 1979, immediately surrounding the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro,the
Brigate Rosse numbered 1,000 militants with 2,000 external supporters. By the end of
1982 and the beginning of 1983,the number of militants had fallen to merely 100,and
the number ofexternal supporters had fallen to 200.^"* By October 31,1982,‘‘the Itahan
prison population included 1,357 terrorists ofthe Left, and 274 additional individuals had
,,75

been identified and placed on the wanted list,

735 ofthose terrorist inmates were

affiliated with the Brigate Rosse, a number more than half ofthe total. Moretti alludes
post-factum to their demise when he says,“Although in 1978 we appeared strong, we
understood [after Moro’s assassination] that the guerrilla period was over, and that the
„76

real war was about to begin - a war that would lead to tragedy,

It was apparent that

the glory days ofthe Brigate Rosse were at their end.
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Loss of Support from the Extra-parliamentary Left
Renato Curcio expressed his desire for what he wanted to accomplish through the
Brigate Rosse in a pamphlet in January 1970. His main concept was autonomia,“the
movement of the proletariat’s liberation from the complex hegemony ofthe bourgeoisie,’
and he further described this movement as fimdamental to Marxism, which required “the
destruction ofthe global system of exploitation and the construction ofan alternative
„77

social organization,

The violent actions taken for the liberation ofthe proletariat were

justified as a necessary means for following the Marxist ideology. The original motives
of the historic nucleus were not based on violence for the sake of violence, but rather,
violence for a cause. The increased violence ofthe Brigate Rosse, and specifically the
second generation, undermined the goal that was initially set for the BR. The brigatisti
could not develop a relationship with the proletariat, the very people they were trying to
reach, and even alienated other organizations that had supported them. As the Brigate
Rosse"s violence grew unsuccessful,they did not reconsider their initial choice, but
decided to intensify the violence. The failure oftheir strategy led them further into
violence and further into exclusivity and isolation.
As previously stated, though AO did not agree with all ofthe actions ofthe
Brigate Rosse, Autonomia Operaia supported the Brigate Rosse in the early years, and
even halfway through the second generation, out ofa similar desire for a communist

77

Lotta sociale e organizazione nella metropoli,” January 1970, in Soccorso Rosso, Brigate rosse, pp. 4653.

31

revolution. Even during this period ofsupport, however,the differences between the
Autonomia Operaia and the Brigate Rosse were substantial and became troublesome over
time.
The Brigate Rosse had always been a clandestine organization, from its
conception in 1969. The Autonomia Operaia, however,did not agree with the idea of
clandestinity, reflecting their general ideas about the stage the revolutionary struggle had
reached in Italy. In an April 7,1978 edition ofLotto Continua,the Autonomia Operaia
admonished the Brigate Rosse for their decision to use clandestinity, and the journal
wrote that the representative of the AO stated,“Ours is a mass movement...to enter into
the clandestine life would cancel this characteristic of our group. It is an invitation that
will not be accepted.

However,clandestinity was only one difference beteen the

Brigate Rosse and Autonomia Operaia.
The two organi2:ations disagreed on the issues oforgamzation and insurrection.
According to Negri, the leader of the AO,as regards the concept oforganization,“The
BR [had] an extremely centralized idea of organization (the party), which [was] presented
as the fundamental and exclusive weapon and the determining factor in the clash with the
state. The mass movement, while said to be fundamental,[was]regarded as ineffective
«79

without the party's external guide,

Negri viewed the tactics ofthe Autonomia Operaia

as having a purer Marxist ideology, and “on the basis ofthe tradition of Italian
revolutionary Marxism — [considered] organization as mass organization that filters and
translates into itself, overturning the capitalist organization ofsocial production.
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Autonomia [emerged] out ofthe growth ofthe immediate needs ofthe proletariat

The

dividing factor was over the focus ofthe revolution. While the Brigate Rosse focused on
the communist party as the integral point in the revolution,Autonomia Operaia thought
that in sticking to traditional Marxist-Lenimst ideology, one was also required to center
the organization’s revolution around the proletanat rather than the commumst party, as
the Brigate Rosse did.
Regarding insurrection, Negri also points out some key differences: For the
[BR],the concept ofinsurrection is connected to the issue oftaking over state power. For
Autonomia, take-over is a meaningless term at least on two accounts: that no State power
exists outside the material organization of production; that there is not revolution except
as a transitional process in the making and partly realized.”^* Autonomia Operaia
rejected any notion of a state “coup” through violence directed towards institutions. Any
action must, first and foremost, be aimed at providing for the proletanat The beliefs of
the BR differed, because for the Brigate Rosse, proletanan liberation could not be
achieved while the state power structure is still intact.
Autonomia Operaia was also opposed to the Brigate Rossers extreme use of
violence. When the violence ofthe BR continued to escalate, the AO warned them to
cease their extreme violence. The final straw for the Autonomia Operaia was the
kidnapping of Aldo Moro on March 16,1978,and his eventual murder on May 9,1978.
Other members ofthe extra-parliamentary Left understood that the ramifications ofsuch
an act would be severe and “warned the Brigate Rosse not to kill Moro....[they said that]
Moro’s murder would be ‘outside every dialectic and revolutionary logic’ as well as ‘a
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gross political and strategic error’...[Also],‘the cadaver of Moro’ would serve the parties
of the state as ‘a mystical body.

It was with Moro’s death that the members of

Autonomia Operaia began to see themselves as different from the Brigate Rosse in the
war on capitalism. Although they had similar ideologies,the action taken to support
those ideologies was quite different. Pipemo,a colleague ofNegri’s and a writer for
Metropolis stated that the murder of Moro was not wrong because ofthe excessive
violence, but because it resulted in a strengthening ofthe state. The Brigate Rosse had
failed to understand what the strategic goal oftheir tactically brilliant plan should have
been...[and they] went their own way without consulting anyone in the Movement to
r,83

which they belonged.
With the escalation of violence, the general attack on the state, and the death of
Moro, other Left-wing organizations became worried that they would be tied to the BR
and accused ofthe same violent acts. Knowing what the severity ofthe repercussions
would be,“the important leaders in the large network ofradical groups more or less
>)84

sympathetic to the revolutionary project were opposed to killing Moro.

Suddenly,the

fear ofthe ramifications ofthe BR’s actions began to outweigh the benefits ofremaining
close to the Brigate Rosse.
In some cases, one ofthe intermediate goals most useful to terrorists and most
readily obtainable is the publicity given to them and their actions. But to take on the
authority ofthe state with hit and run terrorism is to overestimate the effectiveness ofthe
symbol, and in such cases publicity is of little value. The BR had succeeded in
criminalizing dissent, in rendering large sectors ofthe Left, including some members of
82
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the PCI, vulnerable to the suspicion of being “pro-terrorist

Other Leftist members

became worried about how the terrorist acts would affect their revolution, and also about
the repercussions from the state.
Afraid of the consequences Moro’s killing would have on the Autonomia
movement, other members ofthe Left tried to separate themselves from the BR. Pipemo
and Pace, two colleagues of Negri, were willing to work with the Partito Socialista
Italiano (Italian Socialist Party - PSI), against the Brigate Posse, concerning the death of
Moro. A representative of Autonomia Operaia also referred to “the potential damage the
Moro kidnapping (and eventual assassination) might do to the ultraLeft in general” and
asked for a strategy to confront that danger.^ To avoid such “dangerous” associations,
many ofthe organizations in the extreme Left adopted the phrase‘We con lo Siato ne con
le BR""(“neither with the state nor with the BR”)as a safety measure. And at a group
meeting ofthe Autonomia at the University ofRome on May 6,1978,the members
discussed how to respond to the comunicato received from the BR announcing Moro’s
death sentence. The “general opinion was one ofcondemnation ofthe [Brigate Posse] as
revealed in the response statement released:‘The proletarian communists do not loll
political prisoners.’
However, the criticism and discontent was not all one-sided. The Brigate Posse
defended their actions by criticizing the other extreme Left organizations. The Brigate
Posse actually considered the intellectuals ofAutonomia as “fake revolutionaries, with no
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capacity to organize anything except seminars and conferences,\N^ere they talked
endlessly about matters that plainly required not talk but the revolutionary action supplied
by the [Brigate Rosse].

The BR justified their extremism through the beliefthat the

other Leftist organizations were too moderate. The Brigate Rosse felt their violent
actions were making more of a difference than the intellectual ideas ofthe extraparliamentary Left.
Concerning the case of Aldo Moro, Moretti, one ofthe BR leaders, showed no
concern and little interest in what the leaders ofAutonomia thought about the
>,89

kidnapping.

The BR did not agree with the actions ofthe intellectuals, and therefore,

did not desire their opinions. Enrico Fenzi, a former professor at the University of Genoa
and an ex-terrorist, shared the same sentiments as the Brigate Rosse^ applauding the BR
for their work and admonishing Autonomia Operaia. Even as an ex-terrorist Fenzi felt
that there was a degree of“grandeur in the [Brigate Rosse] act of Marxist-Lenimst
revolutionary faith” that he considered “far superior ethically to the elaborate ideological
shiftiness of such ingeniously coy radical ideologists as Toni Negri, who [after the
murder Moro] wanted the world to believe that the revolutionary program ofAutonomia
stood in the sharpest possible contrast to the revolutionary program ofthe [Brigate
„90

Rosse].

Until the murder of Aldo Moro,the Autonomia Operaia had chosen to remain
supportive to the Brigate Rosse. However, with the death ofMoro,the violence had
become too great and the possibility ofrevenge by the state too real. In 1978, after the
murder of Aldo Moro, Rosso and Autonomia Operaia publicly ended their relationships

Drake, Aldo Moro Murder Case, 168.
Ibid, 177.
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with the Bngate Rosse. Rosso actually printed the statement:“Red Brigadism [is] the
senile illness of communism

r,9I

Richard Drake notes that “what formerly had been the

criticism of one comrade to another over points of procedure now became transformed
into an obliterating condemnation; lacking the correct principles of class analysis,the
[Brigate

had embarked upon a campaign of destabilization that might have
,»92

worked in a backward country, but not in [Italy],

The BR had reached a point of

violence equivalent to barbarism, and Rosso could not support that. This mutual rejection
of each of the organizations greatly lent to the loss ofsupport for the Brigate Rosse.
The murder of Aldo Moro was a turning point in the success ofthe Brigate Rosse.
It marks the point of alienation of the Brigate Rosse from the rest ofthe Leftist
revolutionary organizations. However,a crushing blow came to the Brigate Rosse with
the condemnation from the proletariat for whom they were fighting. With the escalating
violence of the Brigate Rosse, murder became a customary aspect ofthe organization
over the years. However,the murder of Guido Rossa would prove a mistake that enraged
the proletariat and cost the Brigate Rosse much ofits support. Rossa was “an Italian
Communist’s Communist,” a mechanic,and an active union member.^^ He was the
quintessential worker; however, he was also fervently antiterrorist in his beliefs. After
denouncing a fellow factory worker, Francesco Berardi,for passing out Brigate Rosse
literature at work, he was killed months later, on January 24,1979,shot to death by the
Brigate Rosse. This act infuriated other workers, who viewed the Brigate Rosse as
having turned on their own people. Due to this act of violence against a fellow proletariat
90
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“spontaneous strikes and demonstrations...[occurred] in all the major factories of Genoa
Sixteen thousand workers from [Rossa’s factory] alone took to the streets and denounced
the Tascists/Brigadists.”'^ The already declining support ofthe

Rowe due to

the murder of Aldo Moro,combined with this second attack,the murder ofa fellow
proletarian, alienated the BR from not only the extra-parliamentary Left, but also the
proletariat for whom they were fighting. The combined effect ofthe denunciation ofthe
BR from both the organized Left and the workers severely hurt the Brigate Rosse.

Useless International Networks
Over the course of the 1970s,the left-wing clandestine organizations spent “very
limited energies in developing a network of contacts with other underground groups
,,95

active abroad.

However, after the murder of Aldo Moro,there was disintegration

within the BR as well as dissolution ofthe local networks formed by the Brigate Rosse.
But the BR did not stop their terrorist actions; they believed in the course ofaction they
were taking. Rather, they were forced to look to other organizations for aid.
As the support from the left-wing extra-parliamentary organizations decreased.
the Brigate Rosse began to feel pressure to find other support. By early 1978,“the
decline in the struggle by the violent faction ofAutonomia [and]the failure ofthe effort
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to suspend or adjourn the trial of the organization's historical leaders” all resulted in the
96

communications and actions of the Brigate Rosse and dieir international networks.
Italian terrorist writings have always contained some international ideas. They
97

revolted against “warmongering foreign policy” and wanted Italy to get out ofNATO.
They had also allied themselves to “all anti-American peoples,” such as the Lebanese,
Iranians, Palestinians, and Libyans united in an anti-imperialist fighting front,'as well as
with German and Basque terrorist groups.^^ It was a fight against capitalism and
America, the country viewed by the BR as the embodiment ofcapitalist ideals. The
Brigate Rosse even “issued a ‘strategic resolution'” in February of 1978 “whose contents
also espoused "the necessity to develop to the fullest extent historically possible
operational co-operation, reciprocal support, and solidarity’ with the elements that
«99

constitute proletarian internationalism,

This strategic resolution named such

international organizations as the Red Army Faction in Germany,the Armed Nucleus for
Popular Autonomy(NAPAP)in France, and any “autonomous movements possessmg a
Socialist nature,” and referred to the Irish Republican Army as well as the Basque
ETA.100
While the support for the Brigate Rosse fi-om the Italian Left-wing extraparliamentary organizations waned after the murder of Aldo Moro,like-minded
international terrorist organizations began to show their support for the BR. France had
not only granted political asylum to such prominent figures ofAutonomia as Toni Negri
96
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and Oreste Scalzone, as well as 160 other terrorists, but had also “refused Man requests
.101

for the extradition of Franco Pipemo during the Moro kidnapping.
The Red Brigades can be connected to Libya, as well as the PLO. ""Akher Sa'a,
the semi-official Egyptian weekly magazine,[had] published a list oftraining camps
»»102

maintained by Libya for training terrorists,

The Palestinian Liberation Organization

applauded the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro as a success,and representatives of
«103

the PLO, considered it “proof that the BR ought to be taken seriously.
Contact between the PLO and the Brigate Rosse was first made foUowing the
104

kidnapping of Aldo Moro,in either May or June 1978.

An agreement was made

between Mario Moretti, the leader ofthe BR at that time,and Salah Khalaf Abu-Iyyad,
the leader of a Marxist faction within the PLO that wanted to form alliances with other
105

Marxist organizations for aid in setting up an anti-Israeli front,

The verbal

cooperation agreement between the PLO and the BR was comprised ofa number of
points, such as:
1. The PLO would deliver weapons to the BR[and] would offer assistance to
BR fugitives.
2. BR members would be allowed to train in Palestinian camps in the Middle
East.
3. The BR would store weapons in Italy for use by the PLO.
106
4. The BR would participate in attacks against Israeli personalities in Italy.
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However, although the agreement contained grand promises,few ofthose promises

were

really kept.
The peak ofcooperation between the PLO and the BR occurred during the early
years of 1978 and 1979, during which time there were only “[two]confirmed cases of
assistance granted by the Palestinian organizations to the BR...[in the]form oftwo
«107

particularly large arms consignments by Fatah to the BR.

Other than these cases of

assistance, no other aspects of the agreement were definitely fulfilled. There is no
evidence that the BR "[was] operationally involved in Palestinian activities in Italy”;
weapons transferred between the PLO and the BR were seized before the PI.0 could
make use ofthem, and since most BR fugitives fled to France,there was no real need for
the offer of the PLO to aide the Brigate Rosse's fugitives.

Though the support ofthe

PLO was helpful to the BR,for the members ofthe Brigate Rosse,the struggle was for
the Italian proletariat. The hrigatisti did not consider themselves to be involved in the
international revolution, but preferred to focus on their struggle within Italy. As stated by
Peci,"What concerned us was class war in Italy, not war against the Israelis. In other
words, we were not interested in serving as a military arm ofthe PLO. We believe that
»,109

we can be useful to each other, but we are not prepared to do their work for them.

Although the Brigate Rosse wanted to expand,they wanted to do it on dieir own terms,
while still keeping the focus ofthe struggle on the Italian proletariat.
Also, some ofthe international terrorist organizations were known to have
inspired the actions of the Brigate Rosse as the BR grew more extreme. The PLO had
previously been a source of inspiration to the Brigate Rosse. For example,the PLO
107
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attacks at Maalot (in which 21 children were killed during a hostage situation because the
government would not release Arab terrorists from IstraeU prisons)and other cities in
no It was not the violence
Israel were examples of what the BR intended to do in Italy,
that attracted the Brigate Rossc but the symbolism of“an eye for an eye” as previously
stated. The RAF in Germany was also a source of motivation for the Brigate Rosse. The
brigatisti admired the actions of the RAF,specifically the “1977 Red Army Faction
Mill

. Although the kidnapping

kidnapping of German industrialist Hans Martin Schleyer

ended in failure for the RAF,the brigatisti were inspired and viewed it as the type of
operation that could succeed in Italy, which was “a more vulnerable country than
Germany.

112

Along with the PLO,the Brigate Rosse has been connected to the Red Army
Faction in Germany,Direct Action, and the Cellules Communistes Combattantes
(Fighting Communist Cells - CCC),a communist terrorist organization in Belgium,all of
113

which had connections with Middle Eastern terrorists.

‘During the late 1985

Palestinian terror attacks in Rome,culminating in the Christmas slaughter at Leonardo da
Vinci Airport, the police thought that surviving [brigatisti] might have been involved,
although no evidence was found. The BR made statements about the Middle East which
supported the PLO and even “suggested the possibility and even the likelihood ofan
Ml 14

alliance with the perpetrators.
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The Brigate Rosse have also been linked to the Bulgarians foreign intelligence
agency, concerning one of their most visible international terrorist acts,the kidnapping of
General Dozier in December 1981. By kidnapping Dozier,the Brigate Rosse “hoped
that, in exchange for the NATO secrets that might be extracted from General Dozier,the
Bulgarians would provide weapons and money so that the revolutionary stmggle could be
continued.

l 15

Ultimately, however, the international networks that the BR created were

not able to sustain it.
Although the Brigate Rosse have been connected to multiple international terrorist
organizations, none could replace the support lost by the distancing from the BR by the
left-wing extra-parliamentary organizations after the murder of Aldo Moro. The majority
of the international networks were sporadic and short-lived, never able to be sustained
long enough to make an impact. The networks mostly consisted of arms trades, and they
were not solidly based on a similar ideology or goal. Ultimately,the international
networks did not function as the BR had hoped. They did not lend support in the form of
numbers as the larger Italian proletarian Left had, and by creating international networks,
the Brigate Rosse had taken its struggle outside ofItaly, and away from the people who
had been the original focus of the BR’s revolution.
The international commitment ofthe Italian terrorists did not strengthen the BR,
but rather, showed its weaknesses. The Brigate Rosse"s international terrorist
connections did not help their revolution, but made their failures more apparent. Possibly
their most visible operation,“the kidnapping of General Dozier in December 1981 also
became their most clamorous failure, when he was freed, albeit after 42 days, by the
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Italian police,

During this terrorist operation,the BR’s target had become

international, rather than keeping the revolution local. The attention ofthe botched
kidnapping gave the BR much desired publicity, but also led the police to arrest a much
larger number of hri^atisH than with previous kidnappings. By the middle of April of
1982,just months after Dozier’s rescue,“the police reported having arrested 225
«U7

terrorists since the first of the year.

After the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro,there was a steady decline
in the number of actions carried out by the Brigate RossCy due to a combination ofthe
lessening of support from the Left-wing extra-parliamentary organizations and the
proletariat, inadequate support from international organizations,the tougher security
measures of the government, and the information from ihtpentiti. By 1980,just two
years after the murder of Aldo Moro, acts of political violence and terrorist attacks ofthe
Left fell by more than eighty percent, decreasing from 1,590 acts in 1978 to 309 acts in
1980. By 1982, the political violence and terrorist attacks had decreased by nearly
118

ninety-five percent, as shown by Table 3.
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TABLE 3 Terrorist Attacks 1978 - 82
Terrorist Attacks
Acts of Political
(Responsibility Not
Violence
Claimed)

Terrorist Attacks
(Responsibility
Claimed)

Sum

I

1978
480
636
1590
472
1979
380
143
659
1182
I
1980
46
41
222
309
1981
26
23
164
115
i
11
3
1982
71
85
; Source: Donatella della Porta and Maurizio Rossi, Cifre crud^li: bilancio del tenvrismi
\italiani. (Bologna: Instituo Cattaneo, 1983). 18-19. Reprinted by Eubank and
Weinberg in The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism.

Though these figures include all Leftist terrorist attacks,the staggering decrease shows a
drastic decline in terrorism on the Left, as a whole,and from the Brigate Rosse as a
specific group.
The economy had also changed during the fifteen years of which the Brigate
Rosse were active. As previously stated, the Brigate Rosse formed out ofthe turmoil of
the late 1960s, student and worker movements, political problems,and the slowdown of
economic growth. During the time that the Brigate Rosse were active,economic
developments occurred These developments lessened the animosity against the state and
capitalism, and resulted in a loss of support for the Brigate Rosse. One development in
particular was the increase in Italy’s per capita gross domestic product. From $5,691 in
1965, the real GDP per capita increased to $8,282 by 1975 and to $10,808 by 1985
(shown in constant dollars) in Graph 1 on the next page. This increase in the per capita
GDP shows that the economy was beginning to grow again after the economic decline of
the 1960s.
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With the growth that occurred during the time in which the Brigate Rosse were active, Italian
citizens were feeling more comfortable with their economic situation, and were not as unhappy
with the government. For this reason, fewer people felt a need for a revolution against
capitalism, since, for the time being it seemed to be working for them. As a result, the economic
growth was just another factor in the list of reasons why the Brigate Rosse lost support overtime.
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Conclusion
The Bri^afc Rossc acted successfully for roughly fifteen years. From its
establishment in 1969, the organization was united \vith other Italian organizations in
their struggle against capitalism and what they viewed as a failing political system.
Based in Marxist ideology’, the Bngate Rosse were initially able to attract support
because of a widely felt need for change from students and workers alike. The student
movements of the 1960s and the “Hot Autumn” of 1969 provided the needed base of
support for the Brif^ate Rosse to begin their active struggle against the state. The support
of the legal Left-wing extra-parliamentary^ organizations within Italy helped legitimize
the Brigate Rosse and their acts during the late 1960s and most of Ae 1970s. However,
as the Brigate Rosse grew more extreme in their actions, the reactions ofthe populace
towards the BR began to change.
As the first generation of brigatisti grew fewer in number in the mid-1970s,either
killed because ofthe struggle, or in jail, a second, more violent generation ofleaders
began to take over. Through 1978, the left-wing extra-parliamentary organizations still
supported the BR, reacting to the terror ofthe Brigate Rosse more as a scolding parent
than a comrade in a communist struggle, but ultimately still supportive ofthe BR.
It was not until the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro that the Brigate Rosse
were seriously hurt by their own actions. The Moro murder represented the turning point
for the support of the Brigate Rosse. After May 9, 1978,the activities ofthe Brigate
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Rosse began to falter and then decrease with the loss ofsupport, AlthoughMoio was not
the first victim of the Bri^ate Rosse, he was the top political leader ofdie DC,and an act
against him ran a much higher risk ofbeing challenged by the state. To the BR,More
represented “the embodiment of all that was the most intelligent and therefore the most
m1!9

dangerous in the Chnstian Democratic regime.
The severity- of the act was intolerable for others involved in the communist
struggle. A combination of fear of the government and general disgust by the extremian
of the Bri^afe Rosse after the death of Aldo Moro,led to the terrorist group’s ultimate
undoing. The Bngafc Rosse had murdered public figures in the past, but none that
equaled the level of Aldo Moro. His murder resulted in a severe backlash by the state,
who worked more diligently than ever to put an end to the actions ofthe Brigate Rosse.
The Brigate Rosse had been losing power since the kidnapping and murder of
Aldo Moro. The extremist tactics isolated the BR from its proletariat base and from
public opinion, and ‘the 1981 /?ew//r/Tegislation encouraged defection and enhanced the
120

powers of the security forces,

Their missions were failing, and the humiliation that

the Brigate Rosse endured after the rescue of General Dozier merely added to the
negative effect on the terrorist organization, seeming to secure the decline that had been
evident since the Moro murder, specifically with the passing ofthe new laws,the help
from the pentiti, and the new security measures.
The Moro trial, which began on April 14,1982,seemed to complete the descent
ofthe Brigate Rosse, when the court received confessions from dozens offormer
terrorists. OnJanuary24, 1983, the Moro trial ended,and the court handed out thirty-two
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life sentences and a total of 316 years of imprisonment to sixty-three defendants,

Two

days later, on January 26, Renato Curcio declared that the war was over. He recognized
the failure of his communist revolution, stating: “The aimed stniggle has been shortcircuited, it did not succeed in making the Great Leap Forward, it fell to the ground. Its
,»122

protagonists can only mourn, liberating themselves from its ghost
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